Source: in-cyprus.philenews.com
As transatlantic relations continue to deteriorate, Europe’s push to reduce its dependence on the United States is no longer surprising. While debates often focus on trade, defence procurement and energy security, the EU’s potentially greatest vulnerability may lie in technology.
The European Union’s reliance on the US — and to a lesser extent China — for critical digital technologies and infrastructure represents both a political and economic weakness, Justin Nogarede, a digital transition specialist and analyst at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Germany, said in an interview. In an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, he argued, this dependence can no longer be viewed simply as an economic reality but as a potential strategic liability.
The debate over digital sovereignty is not only about technology; it goes to the heart of political power and values. Central to the concern is what could happen if the US administration under President Donald Trump were to prevent American technology giants from providing services in Europe. An indication of how disruptive such measures could be can be seen in the reported restrictions affecting judges at the the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, who for months have faced limitations in accessing services from companies such as Microsoft and Amazon, as well as financial networks including Visa and Mastercard, following decisions that drew criticism from Washington.
The key question, however, is what the EU can realistically do to safeguard its interests. Nogarede argues that full digital autonomy would be economically prohibitive and ultimately unattainable. Instead, the priority should be to reduce technological dependence while remaining integrated within the globalised digital economy.
How would you define digital sovereignty, and what recent developments have pushed it higher on the political agenda?
I find the debate about definitions not that interesting: no one agrees on the exact meaning of digital sovereignty. However, I think most analysts would agree that the EU’s level of dependence on the US, and to a lesser extent China, for crucial digital technologies and infrastructure is a political and economic liability, and that it should work to reduce this — especially in today’s turbulent geopolitical context.
Beyond that, I think digital sovereignty is not something that can truly be achieved in today’s world, at least not in the sense of maintaining absolute control over digital infrastructure and technology without foreign interference or influence.
The debate around digital sovereignty, or autonomy, should have taken centre stage with the Snowden spying revelations in 2013, but it didn’t. The political circumstances were not there, with US President Obama in office, who was broadly admired by liberal elites across the EU. Why the debate finally took off a few years later has everything to do with the rise to power of Donald Trump in 2016, and especially his return to power in 2025. In particular, the openly hostile rhetoric from Trump and US Vice-President J.D. Vance is unprecedented and very difficult to ignore for EU elites.
There are other elements, such as the accelerated digitalisation during the Covid crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the dawning realisation that the EU’s digital dependence is hurting productivity growth. But they are secondary, in my opinion.
Is digital sovereignty mainly about technology, or is it ultimately about political power and values?
Well, it is about control over technology, and that is ultimately about power and values.
Elon Musk’s control over X means he can exert considerable influence over public debate, including in Europe. He has also closely aligned himself with right-wing ideology and the US administration, and it is clear that this has affected how X operates.
In the long term, no autonomous political system can tolerate this level of political interference in its public debate — and in fact, the US does not tolerate it itself, hence the decision to force the Chinese social media firm TikTok to hand over control of its US operations to the US tech firm Oracle.
Simply put, I do not buy the idea that digital technology is a neutral tool and that the only relevant consideration is how you use it. Of course, a lot depends on usage, but technology also embeds values and at least favours certain uses over others.
To illustrate what I mean: our online environment is largely shaped by US tech firms that optimise for US values and interests, which do not always align with EU principles. For instance, US tech firms have been largely uninterested in designing software that allows for worker influence and respects privacy, because those values are less important in the US than in, say, Germany. There are many other examples — such as the different priority European countries attach to public space and the role of the market, as well as the relative priority of free speech versus other fundamental rights.
Does the European Union’s reliance on American digital technology represent a strategic vulnerability — and if so, in what ways?
Yes, absolutely. It already feels like ancient history, but I vividly remember the Snowden spying scandal — how it exposed the scale of US global surveillance infrastructure, and how this was facilitated by the worldwide reach of US tech firms. This was more than a decade ago, and I cannot even imagine what new technologies are used today for diplomatic and economic espionage.
But there are risks beyond espionage. For instance, because many public and private actors in the EU rely on US cloud providers — such as Amazon, Microsoft and Google — the US administration has a formidable amount of leverage. It could threaten to shut off EU access — the so-called “kill switch” — in order to gain the upper hand in trade negotiations, or worse, in a potential conflict over, for instance, Greenland.
Shutting off EU access to US cloud providers would likely cripple the functioning of many institutions across the EU, from hospitals and universities to public administrations.
Is technological independence a realistic objective for the EU, and what concrete steps would be required to achieve it?
No, at least not in the sense of autarky. The EU is not China. Trying to become self-sufficient in all important digital technologies and infrastructure would be prohibitively costly.
A more realistic ambition would be for the EU to become an indispensable part of a range of important technology supply chains, and to develop European capacity in a few crucial sectors. This could reduce dependence and increase EU leverage.
For instance, chip manufacturing is a global market. If the EU tries to duplicate the entire supply chain — from design to packaging — and bring it under EU control, we are talking about hundreds of billions of euros and years of investment, which would likely never be economically profitable. Rather, the EU should build on existing strengths, such as the chip production equipment manufacturer ASML, to remain an indispensable node in the global supply chain.
For cloud services, I would at least require public authorities across the EU to shift public contracts away from the major US providers towards European alternatives. This would be good for EU autonomy, but also for EU economies. For the private sector, things are more complicated. Particularly for large and globally operating firms, the cloud services offered by providers such as Amazon are unrivalled in terms of scale and scope.
If the EU is serious about pursuing strategic digital autonomy, what actions would that entail, at what cost, and over what timeframe?
The costs are difficult to quantify, and much depends on how strategic digital autonomy is defined. If it means full control over all digital technologies and infrastructure of strategic importance, we are talking about hundreds of billions of euros at least. Again, I do not think that is a realistic aim.
To me, the low-hanging fruit lies in software, which is less capital-intensive than chip manufacturing. The current practice of outsourcing crucial aspects of public services to US cloud and software providers needs to be scaled back.
Some elements of this project may be expensive, but others are not. By replacing proprietary office and productivity software with open-source alternatives, public services could cut costs significantly. For example, the state administration of Schleswig-Holstein expects to save €15 million in licensing costs in 2026. The start-up costs and practical challenges are real, but the longer public authorities wait, the more difficult it will become.
Importantly, there are also non-financial benefits to using open-source software: it can spur innovation, increase transparency and improve security.
If full digital independence is not achievable, can the EU renegotiate its relationship with major American technology companies?
The problem is that there is no single “EU” negotiating with these companies. Firms such as Amazon, Microsoft and Google negotiate with schools, local authorities and ministries, and in many cases they have the upper hand in terms of expertise and bargaining power. Many clients are locked into their ecosystems, making it costly and complex to switch providers. This makes renegotiation difficult.
The EU has attempted to ensure that American technology companies operate in line with EU values and interests through legislation such as the GDPR, the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act and the AI Act. However, I think relying almost exclusively on legislation has proven too narrow. Large US firms possess the legal and technical expertise to ensure superficial compliance, to litigate extensively, or to treat fines as a cost of doing business.
Is Amazon Web Services’ announcement of a European sovereign cloud a possible solution, or simply continued reliance on US technology?
To me, this does not seem like a solution. It appears to be a marketing exercise — what some call “sovereignty washing”. When push comes to shove, any US firm will have to comply with orders from the US government.
These firms do not want to lose access to the lucrative EU market, so they promote “sovereign solutions” to deflect criticism. It would also not address the EU’s objective of capturing more of the economic value of digitalisation, as these services could be sold to public authorities at a premium.
How likely is it that Donald Trump would ban US technology giants from providing services in Europe?
Not very likely, if only because the threat of using the “kill switch” is more effective than actually deploying it. However, the implicit threat may already be influencing policy decisions — for example, in trade negotiations between the EU and the US.
If such restrictions were imposed, what practical consequences would European citizens and businesses face?
It would mean very significant disruption, possibly even societal breakdown.
In the Netherlands, for example, it would likely disrupt social security payments, as well as the daily operations of local authorities, hospitals, the tax administration, media organisations, major banks and virtually the entire education system.